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Abstract- When heterogeneous congestion control protocols 
that react to different pricing signals share the same network, 
, the resulting equilibrium may no longer be interpreted as a 
solution to the standard utility maximization problem. We prove 
the existence of equilibrium under mild assumptions. Then we 
show that multi-protocol networks whose equilibria are locally 
non-unique or infinite in number can only forni a set of measure 
zero. Multiple locally unique equilibria can arise in two ways. 
First, unlike in the single-protocol case, the set of bottleneck links 
can be non-unique with heterogeneous protocols even when the 
routing matrix has full row rank. The equilibria associated with 
diflerent sets of bottleneck links are necessarily distinct, Second, 
even when there b a unique set of bottleneck links, network 
equilibrium can still be non-unique, but is always finite and odd 
in number. They cannot all be locally stable unless it is globally 
unique. Finally, we provide various sufficient conditions for global 
uniqueness. Numerical examples are used throughout the paper 
to illustrate these results. 
Index Terms- Congestion control, Heterogeneous protocols, 
Multiprotocol networks, Equilibrium analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Motivation 
Congestion control protocols have been modelled as dis- 
tributed algorithms for utility maximization, e.g., [9], [13], 
[ZOj, [2X], [lo]. [12j. With the exception of a few limited 
analysis on very simple topologies [19], [ I l l ,  [12], existing 
literature generally assumes that all sources are homogeneous 
in that, even though they may control their rates using different 
algorithms, they all adapt to the same type of congestion 
signals, e.g., all react to loss probabilities, as in TCP Reno, 
or all to queueing delay, as in TCP Vegas or FAST [SI. When 
sources with heterogeneous protocols that react to different 
congestion signals share the same network, the current duality 
framework is no longer applicable. .With more congestion 
control protocols being proposed and ideas of using congestion 
signals other than packet losses, including explicit feedbacks, 
being developed in the networking community. we need a 
mathematically rigorous framework to understand the behavior 
of large-scale networks with heterogeneous protocols. The 
purpose of this paper is to propose such a framework. 
Our emphasis is on general networks with multiple sources 
and links that use a large class of algorithms to adapt their 
rates and congestion prices. Often. interesting and counter- 
intuitive behaviors arise only in a network setting where 
sources interact through shared links in intricate and surprising 
ways, e.g., [26]. Such behaviors are absent in single-link 
models and are usually hard to discover or explain without a 
fundamental understanding of the underlying structure. Given 
the scale and heterogeneity of the Internet, it is conceivable 
that such behaviors are more common than we realize, but 
remain difficult to measure due to the complexity of the 
infrastructure and our inability to monitor it closely. A math- 
ematical framework thus becomes indispensable in exploring 
structures. clarifying ideas, and suggesting directions. Some 
of the theoreticaI predictions in this paper have aIready been 
demonstrated experimentally in [25] .  
B. Samma? 
A congestion control protocol generally takes the form 
Here, L ( j )  denotes the set of  links used by source j, and g ( . )  
models a queue management algorithm that updates the price 
p l ( t )  at link 1, often implicitly, based on its current value and 
the sum of source rates sj(t) that traverse link E .  The prices 
may represent loss probabilities, queueing delays, or quantities 
explicitly calculated by the links and fed back to the sources. 
The function f j ( . )  models a TCP algorithm that adjusts the 
transmission rate xj(t) of source j based on its current value 
and the sum of “effective prices” m!(p l ( t ) )  in its path. The 
effective prices mj ( p l ( t ) )  are functions of the link prices pl(t). 
and the functions m: in general can vary depending on the 
links and sources. 
When all algorithms use the same pricing signal, i.e., 
mj = ml are the same for all sources j ,  the equilibrium 
properties of (1)42) turn out to be very simple. Indeed, under 
mild conditions on st(.) and fj(.), the’equifibrium of (1)- 
(2) exists and is unique [121. This is proved by identifying 
the equilibrium of ( l t ( 2 )  with the unique solution of the 
utility maximization problem defined in [9] and its Lagrange 
dual problem [13]. Here, the equilibrium prices pl play the 
role of Lagrange multipliers, one at each link. This utility 
maximization problem thus provides a simple and complete 
characterization of the equilibrium of a single-protocol net- 
work. 
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When heterogeneous algorithms that use different pricing 
signals share the same network, Le., mi are different for 
different sources j .  the situation is much more complicated. 
For instance, when TCP Reno and TCP Vegas or FAST share 
the same network, neither loss probability nor queueing delay 
can serve as the Lagrange multiplier at the link, and (1)-(2) 
can no longer be interpreted as solving the standard utility 
maximization problem. Basic questions, such as the existence 
and uniqueness of equilibrium, its local and global stability, 
need to be re-examined. 
In the multi-protocol case, we prove that equilibrium still 
exists, under mild conditions, despite the lack of an underlying 
concave optimization problem (Section 111). In contrast to the 
single-protocol case, even when the routing matrix has full 
row rank, there can be uncountably many equilibria (Example 
1 in Section IV) and the set of bottleneck links can be non- 
unique (Example 2 in Section IV). However, we prove that 
almost all networks have finitely many equilibria and they 
are necessarily locally unique (Section IV). Non-uniqueness 
can arise in two ways. First, the equilibria associated with 
different sets of bottleneck links are always distinct. Second, 
the number of equilibria associated with each set of bottleneck 
links can be more than one, though always odd (Section 
IV). Moreover, these equilibria cannot all be locally stable 
unless the equilibrium is globally unique (Section V). Finally, 
we provide three additional sufficient conditions for global 
uniqueness of network equilibrium (Section V), The first 
condition generalizes the full-rank condition on R for global 
uniqueness from single-protocol networks to multi-protocol 
networks. The second condition guarantees global uniqueness 
when the price mapping functions mi = mj are linear and 
link-independent. The last condition implies global uniqueness 
of a class of linear networh. Throughout the paper, we 
provide numerical examples to illustrate equilibrium properties 
or how a theorem can be applied. In 1251, we demonstrate 
experimentally the phenomenon of multiple equiIit’ria using 
TCP Reno and TCP VegasFAST io ns-2 simulatormummynet 
testbed. 
Our formulation is close to the general equilibrium theory 
[171 in economics from which we borrow some ideas and 
techniques. See [41, 161, [71, I221, 1231, P71, P I ,  [SI, 1161, [lI 
for related works. The main mathematical tools used in this 
paper are the Nash theorem in game theory [21], [2], which is 
an application of Kakutani’s generalized fixed point theorem, 
and results from differential topology, especially the Poincare- 
Hopf Index Theorem 1181. They are used to prove existence 
and study uniqueness of network equilibrium, respectively. 
11. MODEL 
A. Nota tian 
A network consists of a sei of L links, indexed by 1 = 
1, . . . , L, with finite capacities q. We often abuse notation 
and use L to denote both the number of links and the set 
L = ( 1 . .  . . , L }  of links. Each link has a price pl as its 
congestion measure. There are J different protocols indexed 
by superscript j ,  and N j  sources using protocol j ,  indexed 
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by ( j . i )  where j 1,. . . , J and i = 1,. . . , N J .  The total 
number of sources is AT := E, N I .  
The L x N J  routing matrix RJ for type j sources is defined 
by Ril = 1 if source ( j , t )  uses link 1, and 0 otherwise, The 
overall routing matrix is denoted by 
All type j sources react to “effective prices” 
their paths. The effective price 
price pi through a price mapping function 
at links I in 
is determined by the link 
which can depend on both the link and the protocol type. By 
specifying function mi, we can let the Iink feed back different 
congestion signals to sources using different protocols, €or 
example, Reno with packet losses and Vegas with queueing 
delay. Let m J ( p )  = (m: (p l ) , l  = 1, . . .  L )  and m ( p )  = 
(m3 ( p i ) ;  j = 1. . . . J ) .  
T h e  aggregate prices for source ( j ,  2) is defined as 
(3) 
1 l 
Let yj‘ = (d,i = 1 ...., N 3 )  and q = ( q j , j  = l . . , : J )  
be vectors of aggregate prices. Then g j  = (@)’ mj ( p )  and 
q = RTm(p) where 
Let XI be a vector with the rate 4 of source ( j ,  i) as its 
ith entry, and x be the vector of 2 3  
denotes matrix transpose. 
Source ( j ,  i )  has a utility function Lri(zi) that is strictly con- 
caveincreasing in i t s r a t e 4 ,  k t  U = (U:: i = 1,. . . , N j , j  = 
1:. . . , J ) .  
In general, if z k  is defined, then 3 denotes the (column) 
vector z = (zk, Vk) ,  Other notations will be introduced later 
when they are encountered. We call (c, m, R! U )  a network. 
B. Nenvork equilibrium 
A network is in equilibrium, or the link prices p and source 
rates z are in equilibrium, when each source ( j ,  i )  maximizes 
its net benefit (utility minus bandwidth cost), and the demand 
and supply of bandwidth at each link are balanced. Formally, 
a network equilibrium is defined as follows. 
Given any prices p ,  we assume in this paper that the source 
rates 4 are uniquely determined by 
f-1 
where (U:)’ is the derivative of U!, and (U!) is its 
inverse which exists since U: is strictly concave. Here [2]+ = 
maxis, 01. This implies that the source rates uniquely solve 
As we will see, under the assumptions in this paper, 
(U!)’-’ (d) > 0 for all the prices p that we consider, and 
hence we can ignore the projection [.If and assume without 
loss of generality that 
2; ( d )  = (4) (4) 
As usual, we use x j  ( q j )  = (x! (a), i = I , .  . . , N j )  and 
z(q) = (d ( q j )  , j  = 1,. . . , J >  to denote the vector-valued 
functions composed of xj. Since q = RTm(p),  we often abuse 
notation and write 4 ( p ) ,  d ( p ) , s [ p ) .  
Define the aggregate source rates y(p) = ( y l ( p ) , l  = 
1,. . . , L )  at links I as: 
$(PI = f w p ) :  Y(P) = W P )  (3 
In equilibrium, the aggregate rate at each link is no more 
than the link capacity, and they are equal if the link price is 
strictly positive. Formally, we call p an equilibrium price, a 
network equilibriiim. or just an equilibrium if it satisfies (from 
(3145)) 
P ( d P )  - c )  = 0, Y(P1 5 c: P 2 0 (6) 
where P is a diagonal matrix defined as P := ha&) .  The 
goal of this paper is to study the existence and uniqueness 
properties of network equilibrium specified by (3)-(6). Let E 
be the equilibrium set: 
E = ( P  e %$I P(Y(P) - 4 = 0, Y(P> 5 c )  (7) 
For future use, we now define an active constraint set and 
the Jacobian for links that are actively constrained. Fix an 
equilibrium price p* E E. Let the acrive consrrainr set i = 
i ( p * )  S L (with respect to p’)  be the set of links 1 at which 
pf > 0. Consider the reduced system that consists only of links 
in i, and denote all variables in the reduced system by E, 1;. y, 
etc. Then, since ~ ( p )  :cl for every 1 E L, we have = i. 
Let the Jacobian for the reduced system be J($) = & j ( p ) / @ .  
Then 
where 
and all the partial derivatives are evaluated at the generic point 
6 
C. Current theoy: J = 1 
In this subsection, we briefly review the current theory 
for the case where there is only one protocol, i.e., J = 1, 
and explain why it cannot be directly applied to the case of 
heterogeneous protocols. 
When all sources react to the same price. then the equi- 
librium described by (3)-(6) is the unique solution of the 
following utility maximization problem defined in [9]: 
subject to Rz 5 c (12) 
where we have omitted the superscript j = 1.  The strict 
concavity of Ui guarantees the existence and uniqueness of 
the optimal solution of (11)-(12). The basic idea to relate 
the utility maximization problem (1 1)-(12) to the equilibrium 
equations (3)-(6) is to examine the dual of the utility max- 
imization problem, and interpret the effective price ml(p1)  
as a Lagrange multiplier associated with each link capacity 
constraint (see, e.g., [131, [201. [121). As long as m ~ ( p l )  3 0 
and ,ml(O) = 0, one can replace PI in  (6) by m l ( p [ ) .  The 
resulting equation together with (3)-( 5 )  provides the necessary 
and sufficient condition for z i ( p )  and ml(pt) to be primal and 
dual optimal respectively. 
This approach breaks down when there are J > 1 types 
of prices because there cannot be more than one Lagrange 
multiplier at each link. In general, an equilibrium no longer 
maximizes aggregate utility, nor is it unique. However, as 
shown in the next section, existence of equilibrium is still 
guaranteed under the following mild assumptions. 
Al:  Utility functions U{ are strictly concave increasing, and 
twice continuously differentiable in their domains. Price 
mapping functions wzf are continuously differen tiable in 
their domains and strictly increasing with mi (0) = 0. 
A2: For any E > 0, there exists a number pmax such that if 
pl > pm, for link 1, then 
These are mild assumptions. Concavity and monotonicity of 
utility functions are often assumed in network pricing for 
elastic traffic. The assumption on mi preserves the relative 
order of prices and maps zero price to zero effective price. 
Assumption A2 says that when pt is high enough, then every 
source going through link 1 has a rate less than 6 .  
111. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section, we prove the existence of network equi- 
librium. We s t a n  with a lemma that bounds the equilibrium 
prices. 
Lemma 1. Suppose A l  and A2 huld Given a network 
( c ,m ,  R, U ) ,  there is a scalar p,, that upper buunds any 
equilibrium price p .  i.e., pl 5 pmav for all 1. 
Proof. Choose c = minl q / N ,  and let p,,  be the corre- 
sponding scalar in A2. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium 
price p and a link I ,  such that pi > pmax. A2 implies that the 
aggregate equilibrium rate at link 1 satisfies 
( p )  < N E  = min ci 
1 
j t  
Therefore, we get a link with p i  > 0 but not fully utilized. It 
0 contradicts the equilibrium condition (6). 
1340 
The following theorem asserts the existence of equilibrium 
for a multi-protocol network. 
Theorem 2. Suppose AI a d  A2 hold There exists an equi- 
libriiim price p* for any nemork ( e ,  
Proof. Let p,, be the scalar upper bound in Lemma 1. For 
any p E [0,pmnXjL, define a vector function 
F ( p )  := Rz(p)  - c (13) 
R, U ) .  
For any link 1, let 
I' p-i := ( P l ,  .... : P l - l , P l + l . - P L )  
Then we may write F ( p )  as F ( p l , p - l ) .  Define function hl 
as 
hl(P1,P-1) := -4%71,P-l) c 14) 
We claim that h l (p l ,p - l )  is a quasi-concave function in p1 for 
any fixed p-t .  By the definition of quasi-concavity in [21], we 
only need to check that the set 
Al := ! Pl I h l ( P l , P - l )  2 1 
is convex for all a E 3. If a > 0, clearly Al = 0 by (14). 
When a 5 0, the set Al can be rewritten as 
Since Fl(pr,p- l )  is a non-increasing function in pl for any 
fixedp-l, the set A( is convex. Therefore h l ( p l , p - l )  is quasi- 
concave in pl .  
Since [O,p,,,] is a nonempty compact convex set, by 
the theorem of Nash [21], the quasi-concavity of h l ( p l , p - i )  
guarantees that there exists a p* E [O,pmaxlL such that for all 
1 E {1,2 ..L} 
We now argue that, for all 1,  either 1) F j ( p * )  = 0, or 2 )  
&(p*)  < 0 and we can take p;  = 0. These conditions imply 
(6), and hence p* is an equilibrium price. 
Case I: f i ( ~ , p * , )  > 0. Since U: is strictly concave, 
4 (pi ,pl i l )  is nondecreasing' in [O, pmax]. Moreover, the proof 
of Lemma 1 shows that f i ( p m a x , p l l ) . , <  0. Therefore, there 
exists a point p ;  in [O,p&] where.F(pl,pS,) = 0. This pf 
maximizes hl(pl ,  p L l )  +
Case 2: FI(O,p*,) 5 0. Since E ( p t , p * _ , )  is a non-increasing 
function in p i ,  we have that 
S (pi, P L ~  1 I 0 for all pi E 10, p,] 
If -ci < fi(O,pT,) I O ,  then f i ( p l , p t , )  and h l ( ~ l , y ? ~ )  are 
strictly decreasing in  pl and hence 
Otherwise we have f i ( O , p : , )  = -cl from ( 2 3 ) .  In this 
situation, all 4 going through link 1 are zero, and hence 
we can set p; = 0 without affecting any other prices. More 
precisely, a (possibly) new price vector @ with $1 = 0 and 
'Fi(pi, p r l )  is strictly increasing unless some zi(p) becomes zero. 
= pg for k # 1 is also a Nash equiIibrium that maximizes 
Thus we have proved that, for I = 1,.  . . , L, 
hk(pk,F-l<) for k = 1,. . . L. 
which is (6). D 
1v. LOCAL UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM 
Theorem 2 guarantees the existence of network equilibrium. 
We now study its uniqueness properties. 
In a single-protocol network, if the routing matrix R has full 
row rank. then there is a unique active constraint set i and a 
unique equilibrium price p associated with it [20]. If R does 
not have full row rank, then equilibrium prices p may he non- 
unique but the equilibrium rates a(p) are still unique since the 
utility functions are strictly concave, This also implies that the 
set of links 1 with yl(p) = cl is the same for any equilibrium 
price p ,  though the active constraint sets where pr > 0 may 
not be unique. 
In contrast, the active constraint set in a multi-protocol 
network can be non-unique even if R has fuH row rank. 
Clearly, the equilibrium prices associated with different active 
constraint sets are different. Moreover, there can be multiple 
equilibrium prices associated with the same active constraint 
set, as we prove below. 
We start with two examples of multiple equilibria. Example 
1 has a unique active constraint set, and yet it exhibits 
uncountably many equilibria. This example is the basis for 
other examples in  this paper. Example 2 has multiple active 
constraint sets but there is a unique (hut different) equiIibrium 
associated with each active constraint set. We then introduce 
regular networks whose equilibrium prices are locally unique 
and characterize them. 
A. Two examples of midtip18 equilibria 
Example 1: unique active constraint set but uncountably 
many equilibria 
In this example, we assume all the sources use the same 
utility function defined as 
1 2 
U!(<) = -- 2
Then the equilibrium rates zj of type j sources are determined 
by the equilibrium prices p as 
2 ( p )  = 1 - (Rj)Tmj(p) 
where 1 is a vector of appropriate dimension whose entries 
are all Is. We use linear price mapping functions: 
m q p )  = K j p  
where h'j are L x L diagonal matrices. Then the equilibrium 
rate vector of type j sources can be expressed as 
&I) = 1- ( R y x i p  
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When only links with strictly positive equilibrium prices are 
included in the model, we have 
yip) = ERG&) = c 
- p ( R q ' l i j p  7 C R ' l - c  
j 
Substituting in x6j(p)  yields 
j j 
which is a linear equation in p for given Rj, K j .  and c. It has 
a unique solution if the determinant is nonzero, but has no or 
multiple solutions if 
det CRi(Ri ) ' l i i  = 0 L 1 
When J = 1, i.e., when there is only one protocol 
and R (which is the same as R' here) has full row rank, 
det(R1(R1)Tli") > 0 since both R1(R1)T and K' are 
positive definite. In this case, there is a unique equilibrium 
price vector. 
When J = 2, there are networks whose determinants are 
zero that have uncountably many equilibria. See Example 5 in 
the Appendix for one where R does not have full row rank. 
We provide here an example with J = 3 where R still has 
full row rank. 
The network is shown in Figure 1 with three unit-capacity 
links, CI = 1. There are three different protocols with the 
f 
Fig. 1. Example 1: uncountably many equilibria. 
corresponding routing matrices 
The linear mapping functions are given by 
h" = I ,  K 2  = diag(!5,1,5): K 3  = diag(l,3; I )  
It is easy to calculate that 
L 
which has determinant 0. Using the utility function defined 
in (IS), we can check that all the following are equilibrium 
prices 
p ;  = pi= 1 / 8 + E  
p i  = 1/4 - 26 where c E [0,1/24] 
The corresponding rates are 
x i  = xi = 7/8 - e x i  = 3/4 -t 2~ 
x 2 -  - x2  -   1/8 - 3~ X; = 46 
All capacity constraints are tight with these rates. Since there 
is an one-link flow at every link, the active constraint set 
is unique and contains every link. Yet there are uncountably 
many equilibria. 13 
Example 2: multiple active constraint sets each with a 
unique equilibrium 
Consider the symmetric network in Figure 2 with 3 flows. 
There are two protocols in the network with the following 
Fig. 2. Example 2: two active constraint sets. 
routing matrices 
R1 = 1 1 , R 2 =  ( l J , l ) T  [i: " 1  
Flows (1,l) and (1,2) have identical utility function U1 and 
source rate d, and flow ( 2 , l )  has a utility function U2 and 
source rate 2. 
Links 1 and 2 both have capacity c1 and price mapping 
functions m i ( p )  = y and m:(p) for protocols 1 and 2 respec- 
tively. Link 2 has capacity cz and price mapping functions 
4~) = P and m ; ( p ) .  
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for 
multiple equilibria [25]. 
Theorem 3, Suppose asdumption AI Iwfds. The network 
shown in Figure 2 has two equilibria provided: 
1) c1 < c2 < 2c1; 
2) f o r  j = 1 , 2  (UJ)'(d) + jjll possibly 00, if nnd only if 
IC3 + 0. 
3) for  1 = I, 2, mT(pl) p2 as pr + j+. and sari@ 
2 m ; ( ( L q ' ( c a  - q)) < ( U 2 ) ' ( 2 q  - c2) 
< 4 ( ( W f ( C 2  - Cl)) 
Proof: We first claim that, if cl < q and (V2)f(2cl - cg) > 
2m:((U1)'(c2 -cl)) ,  then there is an equilibrium point where 
only links 1 and 3 are saturated and link 2 is not. In this case 
the equilibrium price for link 2 is p2 = 0 and, by symmetry, 
those for links 1 and 3 are both p l .  Such an equilibrium, i f  
exists, is defined by the following equations: 
(U1)yxl) = p1 
x1 + x2 = c1 
( U 2 ) ' ( 2 )  = 2 m ; ( p l )  
2x1 + 2 2  < cz 
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Eliminating x2 and p1, the above equations are reduced to: 
(U*)’(C, - 2 1 )  = 2m;((P)’ (d) )  (16) 
2 < c2 - c1 (17) 
An equilibrium exists if and only i f  (16)-(17) has a nonnega- 
tive solution for zl. We now show that (16)-(17) indeed admits 
a unique solution x* > 0 under the hypothesis of the theorem. 
When X I  = 0, we have 
(U2)’(C1 - d) = (U2)’(c1) < p 5 @ = 2m,:[(uy’[o)) 
The inequality and the last equality have made multiple use of 
conditions 2 and 3 of the theorem. On the other hand, when 
z1 = c2 - c1> we have U$(3c1 - cz) > 2ni:(Ui(c2 - q)) 
by condition 3. Since all functions here are continuous, (Uj)’ 
are strictly decreasing, and ni? are strictly increasing, there 
exists a unique 0 < Z* < c2 - c1 such that (!?)’(cl - x * )  = 
We next claim that, if c2 < 2cl and (U2)’(2cl - c2) < 
m;( (U1) ’ (c z  - c l ) ) ,  then there is an equilibrium point where 
only link 2 is saturated and links 1 and 3 are not. In this case 
p1 = p3 = 0, and the following equations determine such an 
equilibrium: 
2m3 (Ul) ’ (X*)) .  
( W ’ ( X 7  = P2 (U2)’b2)  = m;(Pz) 
x1 $2 < c1 2 2  +2 = c.2 
(U”‘(C2 - 221) = m;((Ul)’(zl))  (18) 
Eliminating x2 and p z ,  the equilibrium is specified by 
> c2 - c1 (19) 
When x1 = c2 - cl, we have 
( U 2 ) ’ ( C Z  - 2x1) = (U2)’(2c, - ea) .= m;((ul)‘(Z1)) 
( r r2 ) ’ (cz  - 2x1) = (U2)’ (0)  = pz > m ; ( ( V ) ’ ( d ) )  
by condition 3. When x1 = c2/2, 
where we have used conditions 2 and 3. Hence, again, there is 
a unique z* that satisfies (18)<19). Moreover, from (17) and 
(19), the two equilibria are distinct. 0 
Remark: TCP Reno, which reacts to loss probability, and 
TCP VegaslFAST, which reacts to delay, have ulility functions 
that satisfy the conditions in the theorem. Two equilibria have 
been demonstrated experimentally using TCP Reno and TCP 
VegaslFAST in [25] for this example. 
B. Regular networks 
Examples 1 and 2 show that global uniqueness is generally 
not guaranteed in a multi-protocol network. We now show, 
however, that local uniqueness is basically a generic property 
of the equilibrium set. We present our main results on the 
structure of the equilibrium set here, and the proofs in the 
next subsection. 
Consider an equilibrium price p* E E .  Recall the active 
constraint set defined by p*+  The equilibrium price jY for 
the links in i is a solution of 
By the inverse function theorem, the solution of (20), and 
hence the equilibrium price $*, is locally iinique if the Jacobian 
malrix j(pi*) = dy/afi is nonsingular at 3’. We call a network 
(c: nt? R, U )  regular if all its equilibrium prices are locally 
unique. 
The next result shows that almost all networks are regula. 
and that regular networks have finitely many equilibrium 
prices. This justifies restricting our attention to regular net- 
works. 
Theorem 4. Siippose assumprions A i  andA2 hold. Given any 
price mapping ftirictions m, any ruiiting inatrh R arid ritilin; 
functions U ,  
1) the set of link capacities c for which not all egriilibrium 
prices are locally unique hi~s Lebesgue rneasirre zero in 
2) !he rzitrnber of equilibria for a regiilar neznwk 
For the rest of this subsection, we iiarrow our attention to 
networks that satisfy an additional assumption: 
A3: Every link 1 has a single-link flow (j, i )  with 
%$. 
(c, m, R, U )  is finite. 
( U/ ‘ I f  (Cl )  > 0. 
Assumption A3 says that when the price of link 1 is small 
enough, the aggregate rate through it will exceed its capacity. 
It implies that the active constraint set is unique and contains 
every link. Hence all results below that need A3 can be 
interpreted as with respect to a fixed active constraint set. 
Since all the equilibria of a regular network have nonsingu- 
Iar Jacobian matrices, we can define the index I(p) of p E E 
as 
if det (J(p)) > 0 
I(’) { ‘1 if det(J(p)) < 0 
We have 
Theorem 5. Suppose assumptions A1-A3 hold. Given any 
regular network, we have 
1 I (P)  = (-1Y 
PEE 
where L is the number of links, 
Here, we give an important consequence of this theorem. 
Another implication to global uniqueness will be shown in 
Section V-A. 
Corollary 6.  Suppose assumptions AI-A3 hold. A regular 
network has odd number of equilibria. 
Proof. Since both I ( p )  and (-l)L are odd, the number of 
terms in the summation in Theorem 5 must be odd. a 
Notice thal Corollary 6 implies the existence of equilibrium. 
Although we proved this in Section III in a more general 
setting, this simple corollary shows the power of Theorem 
5. 
Example 3: illustration of Theorem 5 and Corollary 6 
We revisit Example 1 with modified utility functions. Recall 
that in Example 1, as E varies from 0 to 1/24, we trace out all 
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equilibrium points. The components x: and 4: = p i  of these 
equilibrium points are shown by the (red) solid line in Figure 3. 
Other sources .;' and their effective end-to-end prices also 
lie on similar straight lines. Since the network has uncountably 
many equilibrium points, it is not regular, To make it regular, 
suppose we change the utility functions of sources ( j ,  i )  to 
with appropriately chosen positive constants a{ and pi .  These 
utility functions can be viewed as a weighted version of the 
a-fairness utility functions proposed in [ZO]. 
The basic idea of how to choose 4 and @{ to generate 
only finitely many equilibrium points is as follows, First, we 
pick two points in  the equilibrium set of Example 1, say, 
the points associated with E = 0.01 and E = 0.04. These 
choices of e provide two distinct equilibrium points ( q >  x) and 
(&  ?). For instance, (xi, 4 : )  = (0.135,0.865) corresponds to 
6 = 0.01 and (q:?) = (0.165,0.835) corresponds to L = 0.04, 
as illustrated in Figure 3. Then, for each source ( j , i ) ,  find 
-. 
I I I 8 
1 18 1 /6 9; 
Fig. 3. Example 3: consmction of multiple isolated equilibria. 
a{ and such that (4) is satisfied by the two equilibrium 
points (d,zS) and (3,q.) with the new utility functions. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3 where relation (4) with the new 
utilily function is represented by the (blue) curve. and ai, 
@ are chosen so that the curve passes through the original 
equilibrium points (xi, 4:). and (G, 5). More specifically, given 
two equilibrium points (d,$.) and (2, $), choose 
The resulting 4 and ,6: for all flows ( j ,  i) are shown in Table 
I. 
By construction, both ( p i  = 0.135,~: = 0.230) and (pi = 
0 . 1 6 5 , ~ :  = 0.170) are network equilibria. By Corollary 6 ,  
there is at least one additional equilibrium. Numerical search 
indeed located a third equilibrium with (pi = 0.142, pa = 
0.206). 
We further check the local stability of these three equilibria 
under the gradient algorithm (23) to be introduced in Section 
IV-C. The eigenvalues and index for each equilibrium are 
shown in Table 11. It turns out that the equilibrium (p: = 
0.142, p l  = 0.206) is not stable and has index 1, while the 
other two are stable with index -1. The dynamics of this 
TABLE 11 
EXAMPLE 3:  STABILITY AND INDICES OF EQUILIBRIA. 
- . - . - . - . - . - . - . -  - . _  i _ ~ - " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  'jp;,p2;i;3j. ~. - . - . - . - . - - - . - .  - . - . 
- . _ . _ _ I . _ . - . I . - . - . _ . - . .  Eigenvalues I Index I 
I (0.135.0.23.0.135) I -0.21.-17.43.--26.73 I -1 1 
network under the gradient algorithm can be illustrated by a 
vector filed. By symmetry. the equilibrium prices for the first 
and third link are always same. Therefore, we can draw the 
vector field restricted on the plane p1 = p3 to illustrate the 
system dynamics. The phase portrait is shown in Figure 4. The 
(red) dots represent the three equilibria. Note the equilibrium 
in the middle is a saddle point, and therefore unstable. The 
(red) arrows give the direction of this vector field. Individual 
trajectories are plotted with slim (blue) lines. 
pi 
Fig. 4. Example 3: vector field of ( p 1 , p z ) .  
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C. Proofs and iiztuitions 
uniqueness. 
Proof of Thenrem 4. The main mathematical tool used i n  
our proof is Sard’s Theorem 141, [24], of which we quote 
a version here that is taiIored to our problem. Let G be an 
open subset of %: and let F be a continuously differentiable 
function from G‘ to 8:. A point 3 E G is a critical point of 
F if the Jacobian matrix aF/ay of F at y is singular. A point 
2 E 8: is a critical V Q ~ C  of F if there is a critical point 
y f G with z = F ( y ) .  A point in W$ is a repillar value of F 
if it is not a critical value. 
Sard’s theorem. If F : C -+ X$ is continuously differentiable 
on the open subset G 2 8?$, then the set of critical values of 
F has Lebesgue measure zero in !Q$+ 
Fix a routing matrix R and utility functions U .  There are 
at most 2L - 1 different active constraint sets. Let i 2 L 
be such a combination with L links. Consider the set of all 
possible link capacities c = (CL, 1 E L,) under which the active 
constraint set is i, .i.e.. with such a capacity vector c, an 
equilibrium price p has pi > 0 if 1 E i and pl = 0 otherwise. 
Fix such an equilibrium ppint p*. Again let p denote the price 
vector only for links in L: Then $* is not locally unique if 
the function 6 : 8: 4 8: defined by y(fi) = fiz(6) has a 
singular Jacobian matrix 86/86 at e*, i.e., if p* is a-critical 
point of 6. The set of such capacity vectors i. E W$ under 
which all links in i have active constraints in equilibrium 
satisfy 
In this subsection we provide proofs for the results on local 
Y(@*) = 2 
and hence are critical values of y, Since y is continuously 
differentiabIe by assumption A l ,  we can apply Sard’s theorem 
and conclude that the set of such capacity vectors i. has zero 
Lebesgue measure in Xi. The extension to ?J?$ for all link 
capacities clearly also has zero Lebesgue measure in 3?$. 
Since we only have a finite number of different active 
constraint sets, the union of link capacity vectors that give 
rise to locally nonunique equilibria still has zero Lebesgue 
measure. This proves the.Arst..part of the theorem. 
The equilibnum sei E defined in (7) is closed because 
yip) is continuous, and is bounded by Lemma 1. Hence E 
is compact. Since (c ,  m, R, U )  is a regular network, every 
p € E is locally unique, i.e., for each p f E we can find 
an open neighborhood such that it is the only equilibrium in  
that open set. The union of these open sets forms a cover 
for set E.  Since E is compact, it admits a finite subcover 
[l5], i.e., E can be covered by a finite number of open sets 
each containing a single equilibrium. Hence, the number of 
equilibria i s  finite. U 
Proof of Theorem 5. By assumption A3, we can always find 
pmin > 0 such that for any price p and link 1 with pl i pmi,, 
we have 
j i  
Let G‘ := [pmln!pmexIL where pm, is defined in Lemma 1. 
Clearly. all equilibria are in the set G‘. To prove our result, 
we will invoke a version of the Poincare-Hopf Index Theorem 
tailored to our problem [271, [lSI. 
Puincare-Hopf Index Theorem. Let D be an open subset of 8 
and a : DL - g L  be a smooth vector field, with nonsingular 
Jacobian matrix d v / a p  at every equilibrium. If there is a G C 
DL such that every trajectory moves inward of region G, then 
the sum of the indices of the equilibria in G! is ( -l)L. 
Gradient project algorithm. To construct the vector field v 
required by the index theorem, let D L  = G and consider the 
following gradient algorithm from G to G proposed in [13]. 
The prices are updated at time t. according to 
p ( t )  = A(Rz( t )  - C) (21) 
where A > 0 is an L x L diagonal matrix whose elements 
represent stepsizes. A source updates its rate based on the 
end-to-end price 
d t l  = d P ( t ) )  (22) 
A consequence of assumption A3 is that p(t) 2 p,i, > 0 for 
all t under the gradient algorithm (21)-(22). This guarantees a 
unique active constraint set that is L.. Hence the equilibrium set 
E defined in (7) is equivalent to E = { p  E ?J?$ I y(p)-c = 0). 
Combining (21)-(22) with y(p(i)) = Rz(t)  yields the 
required vector field U: 
I;@) = M P j f ) )  - 4 =: .(P(t)) (23) 
whose Jacobian matrix is: 
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where J(p) is given by (8). Clearly, p’ is an equilibrium point 
of U ,  i.e., v(p*)  = 0, if and only if p* is a network equilibrium, 
i.e., p* E E. Since the network (c, m, R, U )  is regular, Jip) is 
nonsingular at every network equilibrium p* E E c G. Since 
A is a positive diagonal matrix, & : ( p ) l a p  i s  also nonsingular 
by (24) at all its equilibrium points p in e, as the index 
theorem requires. 
Consider any point p on the boundary of G. For any I, we 
have one of two cases: 
1) If p l ( t )  = pmaX, link 1 will be underutilized, yla(p(t)) < 
2) If p l ( t )  = pml,, the aggregate rate at link 1 will exceed 
Therefore, every point p on the boundary of G will move 
inward. Hence our result directly follows from the Poincare- 
Hopf index theorem. [3 
CL. and I j l  < 0 according to (23). 
q, y l ( p ( t ) )  > cl, and 7;1 > 0 according to (23). 
v. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR GLOBAL UNIQUENESS 
The exact condition under which network equilibrium is 
globally unique is generally hard to prove. This section 
provides four sufficient conditions for global uniqueness. The 
first condition relates Iocal stability of the equilibria to their 
uniqueness. The second condition generalizes the full rank 
condition of R from single-protocol network to multi-protocol 
network. The third condition guarantees uniqueness when the 
price mapping functions are linear and link-independent. The 
final condition implies global uniqueness of linear networks. 
A .  First condition: local stability and global iiniqueness 
Recall that under assumption A3, we can assume without 
loss of generality that L, is the unique active constraint set 
that contains all links. We say an equilibrium y* E E /ocuZ/y 
sruble if the corresponding Jacobian matrix J(y’) defined in 
(8) is stable, that is. every eigenvalue of J(p*) = a~(p*)/ap 
has negative real part. Hence a locally stable y* is also 
locally unique, but the converse may not hold. To justify 
this definition. take the matrix h in the gradient algorithm 
(23) to be A I .  Then the linearized system is ( 6 p  denotes the 
perturbation around p*) :  
S j  = XJ(p*)@ ( 2 5 )  
Since X > 0 is a scalar. the real part of the eigenvalues of 
AJ(p*) has the same sign as that of the eigenvalues of J(p*). 
Hence the local asymptotic stability of p* implies that the 
gradient algorithm (23) converges locally to p*. 
Theorem 7 .  Sitppose assiimptiuns Al-A3 hold. If all equilib- 
ria have index (-l)L, then E contains exact/? one point. In 
particular, 8 all equilibria are locally stable, then E contains 
auct ly  one point. 
proof: The first claim of the theorem directly follows from 
Theorem 5 .  We now claim that an equilibrium p* E E which 
is locally stable has an index I ( p * )  of (-l>L. To prove 
the claim, consider a locally stable equilibrium price p * .  All 
the eigenvalues of J(p*) have negative real parts. Moreover, 
since J(p*) has real entries, complex eigenvalues come in  
conjugate pairs. The determinant of J(p*) is the product of 
all its eigenvalues. If there are k conjugate pairs ofcompIex 
eigenvalues and L - 2k pairs of real eigenvalues, the product 
of all eigenvalues has the same sign as (-1)L-2k which has 
the same sign as (- l)L+ Hence the index of a locally stable 
equilibrium is (-l)L. 0 
This result may seem surprising on the first sight as it relates 
the local stability of an algorithm to the uniqueness property of 
a network. This is because both equilibrium and local stability 
are defined in terms of the function y(p): an equilibrium 
p* satisfies y(p*) = c and the local asymptotic stability 
of p* is determined by ay(p’)/ap. The connection between 
these two properties is made exact by the index theorem. An 
implication of this result is that if there are multiple equilibria, 
then no algorithm p = f(p(t)), whose linearization around 
each equilibrium p* E E satisfies 6’f(p*)/ap = ay(p*)/@, 
can ever be found to locally stabilize all of the equilibria. 
Conversely, if we can find a region that contains E and such 
an algorithm such that i) all boundary points of that region 
move inwards, and ii) the algorithm locally stabilizes any 
equilibrium then there is exactly one network equilibrium. 
Local stability can be checked in several ways. For example, 
if the Jacobian matrix is diagonal dominant at an equilibrium, 
then the equilibrium is locally stable. This test of local stability 
will be used in Theorem 11 below. 
B. Second conditiopl: negative dejrziteriess of J{p) 
In a single-protocol network, for the equilibrium price to 
be unique, it is sufficient that the routing matrix R has full 
row rank. Otherwise, only the source rates are unique, not 
necessarily the link prices. In a multi-protocol network, this 
is no longer sufficient. We now provide another sufficient 
condition that plays the same role in  a multi-protocol network 
as the rank condition on R does in a single-protocol network 
(see also the remark after the proof of Theorem 9). 
Let f = ( f l ,  ..., f n )  be a vector of real-valued functions 
defined on W. Let G‘ := ( 2  E 8”1If(z) = 0) and COG‘ be its 
convex hull. Define a set V ( C )  of vectors as 
(26) VjG) := { E ~ U  = 4 - .IG for $, d E COG} 
as a function of the set G. 
Lemma 8. rffor ever)! 2 E coG. the Jacobran marrii J ( z )  = 
af(r)/Os exists and vTJ(z)w < 0 f a r  all v E V(G‘), then G 
contains ut most one point. 
Proof. For the sake of contradiction. assume there are two 
distinct points 4 and qh in G such that f(4) = f($) : 0. Let 




f($) - I ( # )  = J(de))(71, - 4)d@ 
0 
Multiplying both sides by ($ - q5)T yields 
($ - 9)T(f(4) - f(4)) = 11($ - 4lTJM@))($ - 
The left hand-side of the above equation is 0, and the right- 
hand side is negative under the assumption of the theorem. 
0 
Let f = p, and let G = E be the set of network equilibria. 
Then Lemma 8, together with Theorem 2, provides a sufficient 
condition for global uniqueness of network equilibrium. 
Theorem 9. Siippuse assumptions A1-A3 hold r f  for esery 
price vector p E COE, the Jacobian mafrix J ( p )  dejaed in (8) 
exists and vTJ(p)v < 0 for  all v E V ( E ) ,  then lhere exisis U 
globally unique network equilibrium. 
In the single-protocol case, a similar result has been ob- 
tained in [20]. However, for that case, the Jacobian matrix is 
negative definite when R has full row rank. Then the condition 
in Theorem 9 always holds and the equilibrium is unique. In 
the multi-protocol case. the Jacobian matrix is in general not 
symmetric and hence not negative definite. Therefore R having 
full row rank is no longer sufficient for the condition in the 
theorem to hold. 
Since we do not know the equilibrium set E ,  the condition 
in the theorem cannot be directly applied to prove global 
This contradiction proves the theorem. 
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uniqueness. To use the theorem, however, it is sufficient to 
find a convex superset E of E an! a superset V of V ( E )  
such that w'J(p)v < 0 for all p E E and 71 E p. This implies 
the condition in Theorem 9 and hence global uniqueness. We 
illustrate this procedure in the next example. 
Example 4; application of Theorem 9 to verify global 
uniqueness 
We visit Exampie 1 for the third time but using log utility 
functions for all sources, i.e.? 
(27) U!($) = ~og(z{) for all ( j ,  i )  
Let the Jacobian matrix be 
J12 513 
521  522 
J ( p )  [ :l 532 
where J M  = J k i ( p )  are functions of prices p given by (8). For 
example 
1 - 1 5 511 = -2 - 
Pi + P 2 I 2  (P1 + P 3  3- $2)' 
It can be seen that J(p) is not negative definite for general p 
unlike in the single-protocol case. Even though E can be hard 
to find, we demonstrate how to find a simple convex superset 
E of E and a simple superset 
Consider the convex set 
of V ( E ) .  
E := {pEx;  1 1 5 p 1 = p s I : 2 ,  1 < p 2 < 2 }  
We claim that E 2 fi, To see this, let p be an equilibrium 
price. If pl < 1, then xi = 1/p1 will exceed the link capacity 
1, and hence pl 2 1. A similar argument gives pz 2 1. To see 
p l  5 3, assume i t  is not true. Then 
x: = l/p1 < 1/2 
0 
Xi = 1/(5Pl  + P a )  < 1/11 
X; = 1/(2pi + $32) < 1/7 
Summing them yields xi + x: + x: < 1. Hence h e  network 
is not in equilibrium, contradicting that p is an equilibrium 
price. Hence p 1  5 2. The argument for p2 <_ 2 is similar. 
Using the definition of E ,  we can bound all Jk l (p )  for p E 
E .  The results are collected in Table 111. 
TABLE I11 
EXAMPLE 4: BOUNDS ON ELEMENTS OF J(p) 
Elements I Upperbound 1 Lowerbound 
h i  1 -0.2947 I -1.1789 




J? 1 -0.0447 -0.1789 
-0.0100 -0.0400 
J31 -0.0100 -0.0400 
Let 
We claim that V ( E )  C v. To show this, note that coE 5 6 
since coE is the smallest convex set that contains E .  Hence 
V ( E )  C V(E),Since pl = p3 at equilibrium, V I  = 'u3 holds 
for any 'U f V (  E )  from the definition of E.  Hence, V (  I?) E 6' 
and therefore V ( E )  v. 
We now check that uTJ(p)w < 0 for all y E E and v E v, 
For any z! E v, wTJ(p)u is the following quadratic form rn '1;1 
and 212: 
t lTJ(p)~ u:(Jii f 533 f 513 i- Jx) + 
vlU2(J12 + 5 2 1  f 5 2 3  + J32)  vzJ22 
If VI and 112 have the same signs. then since J k i  are all negative 
from Table 111. u T J ( p ) u  < 0. If v1 and q have opposite sign, 
then a sufficient condition for vTJ(p )v  < 0 is 
(J l2  + 5 2 1  t J23 + J32)' < 4522(511  533 J13 J31) 
Using Table 111, it is easy to check that the maximum value 
of ( 4 2  + & I +  523 + J32)2  - 4 5 2 2 ( J l l +  JS3 + JI3 + J31) is 
-0.2895. Therefore we have found a superset E of coE and 
a superset of V ( E )  such that uTJ(p)u < 0 for all p E E 
and all v E V .  This implies the condition of Theorem 9 and 
0 hence the global uniqueness of network equilibrium. 
C. Third conditiorz: linenr link-independent mJ 
When the price mapping functions are linear and link- 
independent, i.e., m:(pl) = kjpl for some scalar d > 0, 
it is easy to show that we have an unusual situation in  &he 
theory of heterogeneous protocols where the equilibrium rate 
vector zc solves the following concave maximization problem 
s. t. R C  5 c 
Therefore, such a network always has a globally unique 
equilibrium when U j  are strictly concave. 
Theorem 10. Suppose assumptions A 1 4 3  hold and R has 
fu l I  row rank. Ij for all j and I ,  m i ( p l )  = k j p ~  for  some 
scalar kj > 0, then there is a unique network equilibrium . 
Proof. We prove this by showing that the Jacobian matrix 
J ( p )  defined in (8) is negative definite over all p 2 0. Then 
the result follows from Theorem 9. 
Under the assumptions of the theorem. J(p) can be simpli- 
fied into (from (8)-(10)) 
Here we provide another proof using Theorem 9. 
j 
where D ( p )  = a d ( p ) / 8 q J .  Since U: are strictly concave, 
DJCp) is a strictly negative diagonal matrix for all p 2 0, 
Now. J(y) is symmetric. Moreover, since R has full row rank, 
RRT is positive definite, i.e., for any nonzero vector v E 8'. 
( R j ) T ~  = (( Ri)Tv)T (RI > 0 
j j 
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Then there exists at least one j such that 4 := (RjlTv is 
nonzero. Without lose of generality, assume it is j = 1. Then 
j 
5 P ( q I ) T D 1 ( p ) $  < 0 
negative definite. Hence J(p) is negative definite. 
where the first inequality follows from the fact that D j ( p )  is 
0 
D. Folrrrh condition: linear neworks 
We now apply Theorem 7 to prove global uniqueness of 
linear networks. Consider the classic line network shown in 
Figure 5.  There are L links and L + 1 flows. Suppose without 
xLA' .'..... 
Fig. 5. Corollary 1 I :  line network. 
loss of generality that every Aow uses a different protocol. 
T h i s  implies that D j ( p )  = & j ( p ) / D q j  i s .a  negative scalar 
under assumption Al.  Denote by e3 a L x 1 vector with 1 in 
the j t h  entry and 0 elsewhere, and 1 a L x 1 vector with 1 in 
every entry. Then Rj = ej for j = 1 . .  . L ,  and RLf' = 1. 
Theorem 11. Suppose assumptions Al-A2 hold. The linear 
nerwork in Figure 5 has a unique equilibrium. 
Proof. Take h = 1 in the gradient algorithm (23) .  We will 
prove that all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix 
have negative real part for all p 2 0. This implies that all 
equilibria are locally stable. By Theorem 7 there must be a 
unique equilibrium. 
In the network shown in Figure 5,  for j = 1. . . L,  
Since D j ( p )  is a negative scalar, we can define a positive 
number ,f3j such that: 
For j = L + 1, a m 3 ( p ) / 8 p  is a positive definite diagonal 
matrix. Recall that DJ(p) is a scalar. Assume that the ith 
diagonal entry of matrix DJ(p)am2(p)/3p is -7%. Denote by 
y the L x 1 vectors formed from -yz. Then €or j = L i- I:
By combining the results above, we obtain 
L 
1 
= -diap(Pi) - lyT 
By the following Lemma, all the eigenvalues of above matrix 
have negative real parts. Therefore. there must be a unique 
equilibrium by Theorem 7. 0 
Lemma 12. Suppose that B is a positive dejnite diagoiinl 
matrix. and 7 is a positive vector; rhen the eigeiwalues of 
B + zyT haye positive real parts. 
Proof: See Appendix VII-B. 0 
Remarks: 
1) The above result can be generalized to include more 
than one multi-hop flows, provided they all belong to 
the same type L + 1 and the sets of links they traverse 
form an inclusion. i.e., L(Z?+~) 2 L(z$+' j 3 . . . 2 
L(z$+') for n multi-hop flows. 
2) Theorem 7 also implies the global uniqueness of equi- 
librium for any network in which no flow passes through 
more than 2 links in the active constraint set, when Al- 
A3 hold. In this case, the Jacobian matrix J ( p )  is strictly 
diagonally dominant with negative diagonal entries, and 
hence its determinant is As a consequence. we 
need at least a three-link network to have multiple 
equilibrium if Al-A3 are satisfied. 
3 )  If A3 is violated, then there are two-link networks 
'that have multiple equilibria; see Example 5 with two 
links and two protocols in Appendix VII-A. Since uni- 
protocol network always has a unique equilibrium. Ex- 
ample 5 is a "smallest" network that has non-unique 
equilibria. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
When sources sharing the same network react to different 
pricing signals, the current duality model no longer explains 
the equilibrium of bandwidth allocation. We have introduced 
a mathematical formulation of network equilibrium for multi- 
protocol networks and studied several fundamental properties, 
such as existence. local uniqueness, number of equilibria, and 
ghbal  uniqueness. We prove that equilibria exist. and are 
almost always locally unique. The number of equilibria is 
almost always finite, must be odd when they are associated 
with the same active constraint set. We provide four sufficient 
conditions for global uniqueness. 
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The network topology is shown in Figure 6 with link capacities 
c : [l, 11. The corresponding routing matrices for these two 
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VII. APPENDIX 
A. Sinaliesr nehvork with inultiple equilibria 
Example 5: a two-link network with non-unique equilibria 
In this example, we again assume that all sources use the 
same utility function defined as 
Fig. 6. Example 5:  a network with 2 links and 2 protocols. 
protocols are 
We use linear price mapping functions m j ( p )  = Kjp, j = 
1,2,  where Kj  are 2 x 2 matrices given by 
K1 = 1, 
As for Example 1, we check the matrix 
K 2  = diag(l,3) 
which has determinant 0, implying multiple equilibria. It is 
easy to verify that the following points are all equilibria: 
where E E [O, 1/21 p1 = E, p2 = 1/4 - e/2? 
The corresponding rates are: 
x1 = 3/4 - €12,  1 z: = 114 + ~ / 2  
The capacity constraints are all tight. U 
Remarks: Note that even with a single protocol, the example 
above has non-unique equilibrium price vectors since the 
routing matrix is not fuIl rank. However, in that case, the 
equilibrium rates are unique, unIike the case of multiple 
protocols. 
B. Proof for Lemma 12 
Proof. Suppose that X is an eigenvalue of B + lyT, then 
diag(6i - X) + 1yr is singular. If x = pi for certain i, then, 
since Pi > 0, X is positive. Othewise the following matrix is 
also singular 
/ * \  
I + disg (-) 1 lyT 
Pi - A 
The rank of matrix diag(l/(/3, - X))lyT is 1. Moreover it has 
only one nonzero eigenvalue equal to E, rz/(Pz - A > .  For the 
matrix in (28) to be singular, it must have a zero eigenvalue, 
and this is posslble if and only if 
"iz - -1 F m  ~ 
The real part of +yZ/(@, - A,) is yz(p2 - ReX)/I& - AI2.  If 
ReX 5 0, the sum of the real part of yt/(/3% - A,) cannot be 
-1. So we must have ReX > 0. 0 
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